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INTRODUCTION
The three-pronged Lemon test ... is the only coherent
[Establishment Clause] test a majority of the Court has
ever adopted.... Lemon has never been overruled or its
test modified.1
Although it is true, as stated by Justice Powell, that the Lemon test
has not been overruled nor modified,2 it has been sharply criticized by
both conservative and liberal minded commentators "as not providing 'a
useful framework for Establishment Clause analysis."'3 This criticism
and the seemingly haphazard application of the Lemon test to Establishment Clause jurisprudence 4 spawned hopes that the Supreme Court
would clarify its Establishment Clause jurisprudence 5 when it recently
adjudicated the case, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia.6 Instead of adding a measure of clarity to its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, however, the Court neither applied nor overruled
7
the Lemon test. Rather, the Court chose to ignore the test completely.
The Court's fragmented 5-4 decision failed to even mention the Lemon
test despite its prominence in the Fourth Circuit's adjudication of the
case. 8 Such a "slaying by silence" 9 only exacerbates the confusion that
already exists in the Establishment Clause arena.
1 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). The Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2 For a discussion of the Lemon test, see infra Part I.
3 Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juicefrom Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the
Establishment Clause, 22 N. Ky. L. REv. 621, 634 (1995).
4 For a discussion of the inconsistent application of the Lemon test, see infra Part I.B.
5 See, e.g., Rena M. Bila, The Establishment Clause: A ConstitutionalPermission Slip
for Religion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. Rzv. 1535, 1580 (1995) ("[T]he Court is
presented with yet another opportunity to modify its application of the Lemon test and to bring
establishment clause jurisprudence into line."); Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Religious Freedom
and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principlein Interpretingthe Religion
Clauses, 4 Wm. & MARY BL RTs. J. 351, 359 (1995) ("Rosenberger v. Rector [sic] of the
University of Virginia demonstrates that, in light of the logical inconsistencies of Lemon, a
new test for interpreting the Religion Clauses is needed. Perhaps the Court will view Rosenberger as 'the proper case.., to bring (its) Establishment Clause jurisprudence back to... the
proper track."' ) (quoting Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481, 2498 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
6 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
7 Neither the majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, nor the two concurring
opinions written by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, nor the dissenting opinion written by
Justice Souter ever mentioned the Lemon test or repudiated it.
8 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
9 Luba L. Shur, Content-Based Distinctions in a University Funding System and the
Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake to Rest, 81 VA. L. REv. 1665,
1677 (1995) (In reference to the Court's avoidance of the Lemon test, Shur asks: "Is the
Lemon beast to be silently slayed?").
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Although agreeing that Rosenberger was correctly decided, this
Note argues that the Court's apparent abandonment of the Lemon test as
a benchmark for Establishment Clause analysis leaves lower courts, legislatures, and public policy officials with insufficient guidance by which
to evaluate contemplated policies. Such policy makers justifiably desire
a degree of concrete guidance that will enable them to assess their policy's vulnerability to an Establishment Clause challenge. The Court's
decision falls to provide such guidance and will likely spawn, rather than
quell, future Establishment Clause litigation.
This Note examines the Rosenbergerdecision in light of the Court's
failure to apply the Lemon test. Part I provides an overview of the
Lemon test as first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,10 followed by a
sampling of the critical commentary and confusion that has surrounded
the Court's application and disregard of the test in recent years. Part II
provides a synopsis of the facts and procedural history that ultimately led
to the Court's grant of certiorari in Rosenberger. Particular emphasis is
placed on the Fourth Circuit's application of the Lemon test. Part IR
addresses the Supreme Court's analysis and its ultimate reversal of the
Fourth Circuit's decision. Part III principally focuses on the Court's rationale for holding that the University of Virginia policy of funding student activities would not violate the Establishment Clause if the
University were to fund Wide Awake, the avowedly Christian-oriented
magazine published by the petitioner, Ronald W. Rosenberger. Part IV
discusses the current state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in light
of the Rosenbergerdecision. Part V proposes a modified Lemon test that
incorporates the neutrality principle that informed the majority's analysis. The modified test sets forth a suggested methodology for future Establishment Clause analysis and is designed to satisfy the Court's
concerns regarding the avoidance of government hostility to religion
while simultaneously meeting the need for a pragmatic test for use not
only by the courts but by public policy officials as well.
I. THE LEMON TEST
A.

THE THREE PRONGS OF LEMON

In its early interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court adopted a separationist view of the Establishment Clause stating
that "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the

10 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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slightest breach."'" To provide a sense for the concrete proscriptions
necessitated by the "wall of separation," the Court further stated:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.12
Despite the harsh separationist tones, the Court cautioned that the "[First]
Amendment requires the State to be a neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the State to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
13
religions, than it is to favor them."'
As an outgrowth of this separationist way of thinking, 14 the Court
developed the Lemon test, a three-prong test, for application to Establishment Clause challenges. 15
In delineating the test, the Court acknowledged the difficulty in attempting to provide a bright line of any
magnitude which would facilitate Establishment Clause jurisprudence.16
The intent, as articulated by the Court, was to "draw lines with reference
to three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended
to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 17 The three-prong test
comprises the following areas of inquiry: (1) examination of the legisla-

I

Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946). The "wall" referred to

the words of Thomas Jefferson regarding "a wall of separation between Church and State." 8
WRINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861).
12 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
13 Id. at 18.
14 Kagan, supra note 3, at 630.
15 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16 Id. at 612 ("Candor compels acknowledgment... that we can only dimly perceive the

lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law. The language
of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque.").
17 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
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tive purpose of the statute or public policy being challenged; (2) examination of the "principal or primary effect" of the statute or public policy;
and (3) determination of the extent of government entanglement with
religion that results from implementation of the statute or public policy.' 8
Essentially, the statute or policy in question will be held an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause if the court determines affirmatively any of the following: (1) the purpose of the governmental
action is nonsecular-enacted to aid or promote religion; (2) the primary
effect of the governmental action is either to aid or promote religion, or
inhibit religion, even if the action survives analysis under the first prong;
or (3) the governmental action results in excessive entanglement with
religion.' 9
A review of Lemon v. Kurtzman shows how the Court first applied
the test to an Establishment Clause challenge. Lemon involved challenges to the constitutionality of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes
20
providing state aid to Catholic elementary and secondary schools.
Pennsylvania's statutory program authorized financial support, via reimbursement, to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for the cost
of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in secular
subjects only. 2 1 Rhode Island's statutory scheme authorized direct payment of a 15% annual salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic ele22
mentary schools.
In an attempt to avoid constitutional infirmities, the Rhode Island
statute required that teachers eligible for the supplement only teach subjects also offered in public schools. 23 The statute also required the teachers to use only those teaching materials used in public schools. 24 As an
additional precaution, the statute required the teachers to agree in writing
"not to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such time as he
or she receives any salary supplements." 25 The Pennsylvania legislature
likewise drafted its statute so as to avoid an Establishment Clause violaId. at 612-13.
19 Id. See also Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment
Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND'.
L. REv. 1335, 1351-52 (1995). See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (holding that Alabama's school prayer and meditation statute violated the secular purpose prong); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 397 (1985) (holding that a Community Education program had the primary effect of
advancing religion); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (holding that New York
City's scheme for use of Title I funds violated the excessive entanglement prong).
20 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
21 Id. at 606-07. Support was limited to mathematics, modem foreign languages-Latin,
Hebrew, and classical Greek were excluded-physical science, and physical education. Id. at
610.
22 Id. at 607.
23 Id. at 608.
24 Id.
25 Id.
18
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tion. The statute conditioned eligibility for reimbursement of nonpublic
school expenditures, including teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials, on schools maintaining prescribed accounting procedures that differentiated expenditures for secular and nonsecular
educational services. 26 To ensure proper compliance with the statutory
dictates, the statute authorized state audit of the schools' records .27 As a
final precaution, the statute prohibited reimbursement for any course
containing "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the
morals or forms of worship of any sect."'28 Despite the legislatures' extensive efforts to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, the Court
29
struck down the statutes as unconstitutional.
Applying the first prong of what has become known as the Lemon
test, the Court examined the legislative history of the challenged statutes
and determined that the legislatures enacted the statutes "to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory
attendance laws."'30 Finding nothing to undermine the stated statutory
purposes, the Court accorded the legislatures "appropriate deference,"
31
finding that the purpose complied with Lemon's first prong.
The Court bypassed the second-prong analysis 32 and in so doing
stated that "[w]e need not decide whether these legislative precautions
restrict the principal or primary effect of the programs to the point where
they do not offend the Religion Clauses. ' 33 Rather, the Court was content to rest its analysis on the third prong of Lemon. 34 By failing to
analyze the statutes under the second prong, however, the Court left in
35
doubt both the importance and meaning of this part of the Lemon test.
As a prelude to the Court's analysis of entanglement of government
and religion under the third prong, the Court made clear that under Establishment Clause jurisprudence, total separation between church and
state is neither possible nor required. 3 6 Recognizing that "some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable," the
Court cited "[f]ire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state
requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws" as examples of
permissible contact. 37 Forecasting the difficulty associated with attempt26 Id. at 609-10.

27 Id.
28 Id.

at 610.

29 Id. at 607.
30 Id. at 613.
31 Id.
32 Id.

33 Id. at 613-14.
34 Id. at 614.

Kagan, supra note 3, at 631.
36 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
35

37 Id.
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ing to draw a bright line regarding what is and is not excessive entanglement, the Court stated, "[]udicial caveats against entanglement must
recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
'38
particular relationship.
To determine whether the government entanglement with religion
was excessive, the Court required examination of "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited" by the governmental policy,
"the nature of the aid" provided by the State, "and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. ' 39 Applying
this methodology of analysis to the circumstances in Lemon, the Court
stated that "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under
the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between gov'40
ernment and religion.
The Court first cited the extent of religious activities prevalent at
those schools that were to benefit from the statutory provisions-principally Roman Catholic schools-which led the state legislatures to mandate governmental controls and surveillance by state officials to ensure
that state aid support only secular education. 4 1 The Court then noted that
the particular form of aid, direct monetary supplement of teachers' salaries in Rhode Island and monetary reimbursement of salaries in Pennsylvania, enhanced the entanglement problem due to the need for
surveillance to ensure that the teachers receiving aid did not advance
religion in their classes. 42 Specifically, the Court surmised that "[w]ith
the best of intentions such a teacher [in a parochial school] would find it
hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and religious
doctrine." 43 The Court recognized that such potential dangers required a
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance... to
ensure that [the statutory safeguards required for aid eligibility] are
obeyed and the First Amendment... respected." 44 Contrasting the aid
proposed in the form of teachers salaries to the aid provided to parochial
schools in the form of secular textbooks, the Court noted that while a
textbook can be inspected once to ensure the content will not promote
religion, a teacher "cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of
38 Id.
39 Id. at
41

615.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 616.

42

Id. at 616-22.

40

Id. at 618-19. The Court also noted the potential effect that pervasive religious authority within the schools has on the ability of the teachers to separate the religious from the purely
secular aspects of education. Id. at 617.
44 Id. at 619.
43
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the limitations imposed by the First Amendment." 45 The need for surveillance of the teachers, termed "prophylactic contacts" by the Court,
would involve "excessive and enduring entanglement between state and
'46
church."
Under the Pennsylvania statutory scheme, the Court highlighted the
dangers inherent in providing state financial aid directly to the churchrelated schools as contrasted with providing aid.to either parents of students or students themselves. 47 The Court characterized this danger as
follows: "'Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship
pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards.'"48 The
Court further cautioned that "[t]he history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that such programs have almost always
49
been accompanied by varying measures of control and surveillance.
The Court found such a problem in the statutory provision for the state's
authority to inspect church-related schools' financial records to ensure
compliance with separation of secular and religious expenditure requirements. 50 It characterized such entanglements as an "intimate and continuing relationship between church and state." 5 1 The Court concluded that
"while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be
drawn."'52 The line drawn by the Court struck down the two statutes.5 3
B.

CRITIQUE OF LEMON

Although the twenty-five-year-old Lemon test remains alive in Establishment Clause cases, 54 it has not escaped scathing criticism. Five of
the current Justices on the Supreme Court have expressed concerns with
55
the test, either in substance or in application.
Justice O'Connor, in discussing the efficacy of the Lemon test,
stated, "[i]t once appeared that the Court had developed a workable stan45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 621.

48 Id. at 621 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at

621-22.

51 Id. at 622.
52 Id. at 625.
53 Id.
54 See supra text accompanying note 1.

55 Sekulow, supranote 5, at 358. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718-201 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia J., concurring, joined by
Thomas, J.); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, White, & Scalia, JJ.); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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dard by which to identify impermissible government establishments of
religion.... Despite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic. ' '56 She then recommended that "the standards announced in
Lemon... be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful
in achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." 57 Justice
Rehnquist's characterization of the Lemon test is even more critical.
After providing a historical perspective on the adoption of the Establishment Clause,58 he stated, "the Lemon test has no more grounding in the
history of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it
rests.... The three-part test has simply not provided adequate standards
for deciding Establishment Clause cases . . . [e]ven worse, the Lemon
test has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions." 59 Justice Scalia has gone so far as to characterize the Lemon test
as being "[1like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that ... stalks
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. '60 He recommended the outright abandonment of the Lemon test because it has made "such a maze
of the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be held constitutional." 61 Equally critical is Justice Kennedy in asserting that he does
"not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, [the Lemon] test
as [the Court's] primary guide." 62
Beyond the criticism that members of the Court have leveled at the
Lemon test, the Court's general jurisprudence of Establishment Clause
cases has received criticism from within and without the Court. As
stated by Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel of the American Center for
Law and Justice, "the Court's religious freedom cases are oftenlogically
incomprehensible .... The reasoning suffers from a lack of intelligible
56 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Wallace v. Jaffree involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of an Alabama school prayer and meditation statute. The
Court held that the statute authorizing a dally period of silence in public schools for meditation
or voluntary prayer was an endorsement of religion lacking any clearly secular purpose and,
thus, was a law respecting the establishment of religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Il. at 56-61.
57 Id. at 68-69.
58 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffrey, provided a detailed historical overview of the adoption of the Establishment Clause in which he discussed the proposed wording of the clause from both the House and Senate in 1789 and the intent of James
Madison, as supported by Madison's advocacy for the clause. Id. at 91-104.
59 Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (permitting school property to be used for the presentation of all views
on an issue except those views dealing with the issue from a religious standpoint amounted to
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
61 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Rehnquist, in his

dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, provided case examples highlighting the difficulty the Court has encountered in applying the Lemon
test in a manner which "yields principled results":
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps of the United States,
but the State may not lend maps of the United States for
use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on
American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on
George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but
may not lend workbooks in which the parochial school
children write, thus rendering them non-reusable. A
State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools
but may not pay for bus transportation from parochial
school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a
field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services
must be given in a different building; speech and hearing
"services" conducted by the State inside the sectarian
school are forbidden, but the State may conduct speech
and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian
school. Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the
parochial school, such as in a trailer parked down the
street. A State may give cash to a parochial school to
pay for the administration of state-written tests and stateordered reporting services, but it may not provide funds
for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious
instruction may not be given in public school, but the
public school may release students during the day for
religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance
at those classes with its truancy laws.64
63 See Sekulow, supra note 5, at 353. See also Kevin T. Baine, Education Litigation:
Prospectsfor Change, 35 CATH. LAW. 283, 287 (1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court has decided a
series of education cases that, read together, simply defy comprehension.").
64 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes
and citations omitted). For an attempted defense concerning the seeming inconsistency of the
Court's decisions, see Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 21 (1993) (Black-

mun, J., dissenting) in which Justice Blackmun states, "[a]lthough the Court generally has
permitted the provision of 'secular and nonideological services unrelated to the primary, religion-oriented educational function of the sectarian school,' it has always proscribed the provi-

sion of benefits that afford even 'the opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views."'
(quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244
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Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, characterized one of the difficulties associated with the Court's use of the
Lemon test; he wrote, "[w]hen we wish to strike down a practice it
[Lemon] forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it
forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs 'no more than helpful signposts."' 65
Despite the appreciable condemnation of the Lemon test, "Lemon
lives on,"66 and "the Court remains fragmented in its Establishment
Clause analysis." 67 Recently, however, it appears that the majority of the
Court has embraced the concept of neutrality as a bedrock principle of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 68 The majority of the Court has interpreted neutrality as requiring that the government maintain a position
of neutrality between religion and irreligion, as well as among religions. 69 "In trying to attain the goal of neutrality, however, the Court has
not been able to enunciate any consistent test which would strike the
'70
proper balance.
Commentators embracing the goal of neutrality in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence have also criticized the Lemon test "as hostile to
religion" stating that "[i]n an effort to avoid entanglement with religion,
religious bodies are discriminatorily denied public benefits which would
otherwise be available." 71 Professor Stephen Carter argues that Lemon's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause has resulted in state avoidance
72
of and/or discrimination against the religious component of our society.
Despite this pointed criticism, however, and his view that Lemon is "impossible to apply," Carter admits that "it is far from clear what should be
73
put in its [Lemon's] place."
The analysis of the Lemon test, thus, returns full circle with the
acknowledgment that "[t]he Court... has never repudiated Lemon," 74
and the recognition that "the basic framework of Lemon still informs the
(1977)). Blackmun sees such a distinction as somewhat fine, but intimates that "'lines must be
drawn."' Id at 22 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985)).
65 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 389 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
66 Sekulow, supra note 5, at 355.
67 Kagan, supra note 3, at 621.
68 Kagan, supra note 3, at 629.
69 Id. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist, however, do not embrace the goal of
neutrality between religion and irreligion. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 400 (Scalia,
J., concurring); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70 Kagan, supra note 3, at 630.
71 Id. at 643.
72 STEVEN L. CARTER, THia CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How ArmxicAN LAW AND PoLrIcs
TRrViALuZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 111-23 (1993).
73 Id. at 114.
74 Kagan, supra note 3, at 634.
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majority's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. '75 Furthermore, Lemon
76
is the only test that has attracted a majority of the modem Court.
The stage was thus set in the summer of 1995 for the Court to reexamine the Lemon test and provide a measure of clarity to the Establishment Clause arena, resolving the "inherent confusion [that] reigns in
lower courts. '77 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia provided such an opportunity.
II. ROSENBERGER: THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT
A.

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF VIRGINIA

In September, 1990, Ronald W. Rosenberger, an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia, along with other undergraduate students, established an unincorporated association known as Wide Awake
Productions (WAP). 78 WAP was granted official recognition by the University as a Contracted Independent Organization (CIO). 79 As a recognized CIO, WAP was given certain rights, such as the use of meeting
rooms and computer terminals, and the right to apply for student activity
fee funds. 80 As a condition of being granted CIO status, WAP signed a
standard CIO agreement specifying that "benefits provided to the groups
[CIOs] by the University should not be misinterpreted as meaning that
those organizations are part of or controlled by the University, that the
University is responsible for the organizations' contracts or other acts or
omissions, or that the University approves of the organizations' goals or
activities." 8 1
WAP, through the efforts of its student members, published a nonprofit journal entitled Wide Awake: A ChristianPerspective at the University of Virginia ("Wide Awake").82 Wide Awake is admittedly written
from a "religious perspective" in keeping with WAP's constitution that

states, "the purpose of the organization is to: (1) publish a magazine of
philosophical and religious expressions; (2) facilitate discussion which
fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian view75 Id. at 632.
76 Id. at 630.
77 Sekulow, supra note 5, at 368. See also Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 751(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing the problems
associated with the Court choosing to ignore Lemon, at will, while lower courts remain constrained by Supreme Court precedent to apply the Lemon test).
78 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 177 (W.D. Va.
1992).
79 Id.
80 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 270 (4th Cir. 1994).

81 Id. at 270-71.
82 Id. at 272.
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points; and (3) provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural
backgrounds. '83 WAP is not, however, affiliated with any particular reli84
gious organization.
After publishing three issues of Wide Awake and distributing approximately 5,000 copies of each issue, free of charge, to campus students, WAP, in January of 1991, submitted application to the University
Student Council Appropriation Committee for funding to cover the journal's publication costs of $5,862.00.85 The University Student Council
Appropriations Committee is a subcommittee of the Student Council responsible for the allocation of Student Activities Fund (SAF) monies to
CIOs. 86 The Student Council, under the authority of the Rector and
Board of Visitors ("the Board") of the University, disburses funds to
those CIOs that meet funding eligibility requirements as set forth in the
SAF Guidelines, promulgated by the Board. 87 Payments from SAF
funds are made directly to the CIO's creditors, not to the CIO itself.88
The source of monies for the SAF fund is a mandatory fee collected from
each full-time University student. 89
The SAF Guidelines "charge the Student Council with administering the SAF 'in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the
University as well as with State and Federal law."' 90 Several categories
of student organizations, including religious organizations and organizations engaged in religious activities, are prohibited from obtaining SAF
funds. 91 The Guidelines define a "religious activity" as "an activity
which primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a
deity or ultimate reality." 92 In keeping with the dictates of the Guidelines, the Chairman of the Student Council denied the funding request
following the Appropriations Committee's determination that the publi83 Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 177, n.3.
84 Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr. et al., Annual Fourth Circuit Review for the Civil Practi-

tioner, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 471, 570 (1995).
85 Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177.
86
87

Id.
Id.

88 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 271 (4th Cir. 1994).
89 Harvard Law Review Association, Free Speech and Press Clause and Establishment
Clause-Student Activities Funds-Fourth Circuit Upholds University's Refusal to Consider

Religious Organizationsfor Student Activities Funding, 108 HARv. L. REv. 507, 508 (1994).
The SAF Statement of Purpose, as published in the Guidelines, is as follows: "The purpose of
the student activity fee is to provide financial support for student organizations that are related
to the educational purpose of the University of Virginia. As a required student fee, the monies
collected by the University for funding student activities are public funds which must be administered in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the University as well as
with state and federal law." Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 180.
90 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271.
91 Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 177.
92 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271, n.2.
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cation of Wide Awake constituted a religious activity. 93 WAP pursued
94
all administrative rights to appeal available within the University.
Having failed to secure a reversal of the Student Council's initial determination of ineligibility, WAP filed suit in Federal District Court in the
95
Western District of Virginia on July 11, 1991.
Rosenberger's complaint set forth three constitutional challenges to
96
the SAF Guidelines' exclusion of religious activities from funding.
The claims were focused on the Guidelines' exclusion of religious activities from funding, not on the University's refusal to fund WAP specifically. 9 7 Count One of the complaint alleged:
the guidelines' proscription of SAF funding for the publication costs of Wide Awake violated the Free Speech
and Free Press Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution... (1) by unlawfully depriving the members of Wide Awake Productions of government benefits solely because of the content and
viewpoint of their speech in Wide Awake; and (2) by illegally excluding the members of Wide Awake Productions from the 'limited public forum' created by the
Rector and Visitors' establishment of the SAF and promulgation of the funding guidelines. 98
Count Two of the complaint alleged:
the guidelines' denial of SAF funding to 'religious activities' violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution... by discriminating in the granting of a government benefit based
upon (1) the religious content of the expression in Wide
Awake; and (2) the religious character, or affiliation of
the members of Wide Awake Productions. 9 9
93 Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 274. In addition to the claims predicated upon the alleged
violation of the Federal Constitution, plaintiffs appended alternate and supplemental claims
under the provisions of Article I of the Constitution of Virginia and the Virginia Act for
Religious Freedom. Id. Because the state law claims were not pursued on appeal, they will
not be discussed.
97 Id.

98 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3 ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... "). Count One of the complaint also challenged the
Guidelines' "definitions for allocating SAF funds to CIOs" as being unconstitutionally vague
and unlawfully overbroad. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 274-75.
99 Id. at 275. Count Two also alleged the defendant failed "to give reasonable accommodation to the plaintiffs' religious beliefs." Id.
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Count Three of the complaint alleged that "the guidelines' prohibition
against subsidizing 'religious activit(ies),' coupled with the Rector and
Visitors' denial of SAF funds to Wide Awake Productions, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal

Constitution." 00
Rosenberger sought: (1) declaratory judgment that the Guidelines'
prohibition against funding religious activities violated WAP's constitutional rights; (2) a permanent injunction against the Rector and Visitors
from denying funding to WAP; (3) awarding of compensatory damages
of at least $5,862.00; and (4) an order awarding WAP reasonable costs
and attorneys' fees.' 0 The parties agreed that there were no material

10 2
facts at issue and each sought summary judgment as a matter of law.
The district court ordered summary judgment in favor of the University of Virginia, dismissing all plaintiffs' claims. 10 3 In so ordering,
the district court reasoned that the student activities fund was a nonpublic
forum, not a limited public forum, as urged by plaintiffs.' °4 The court

100 ld. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 4 ("No State shall make or.enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Count Three was
specifically subdivided into the following contentions:
(1) that the guidelines 'den(ied) plaintiffs the benefits to which other students and
CIOs are entitled' by unconstitutionally discriminating against Wide Awake Productions on the basis of the content or viewpoint of its members' speech and association; and (2) that the guidelines unconstitutionally discriminated against the
plaintiffs' religious speech 'by denying [them] the benefits that other students and
CIOs engaged in religious speech and activities receive and have received .....
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 275 (alteration in original).
Plaintiffs maintained that the alleged viewpoint and religious-based discrimination was
neither justified by a compelling state interest, nor narrowly tailored to achieve "whatever
minimal interest" the University might have in refusing to fund student religious activities. Id.
In support of their claim of discrimination, plaintiffs noted that for the academic year 1990-91,
343 student organization were recognized as CIOs. Of these 343 groups, 135 applied for SAF
funding, and 118 were awarded SAF monies. Included within the 118 funded activities were
15 student publications, as well as the Muslim Students Association, the Jewish Law Students
Association, and the C.S. Lewis Society. Id. at 271.
101 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271.
102 Id. at 276.
103 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 184 ( W.D. Va.
1992).
1O4 Id at 180. The characterization of the SAF as either a nonpublic or limited public
forum affects the degree of scrutiny the court will apply to determine whether the government's (University's) policy violates the Constitution. "A limited public forum is property
'which the State has opened for use by the public even if it was not required to create the
forum in the first place."' Id at 178 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Access to a limited public forum may only be restricted by
the State if the restriction is "drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest." Id. A nonpublic
forum "consists of public property which is not 'by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication."' Id. (quoting Perry,460 U.S. at 46). Access to a nonpublic forum "can be
limited by restrictions which are 'reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression
merely because the public officials oppose the speaker's views."' Id. (quoting Cornelius v.

716

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6:701

stated that "consistent, purposeful exclusion of certain groups [religious
organizations, political groups, fraternities, etc.] indicates that the SAF is
10 5
indeed a nonpublic forum."
Following its determination that the SAF was a nonpublic forum,
the court analyzed the Guidelines to determine whether the restrictions
imposed on religious activities were reasonable or reflective of an effort
to suppress expression based on University opposition to the particular
views espoused by WAP. 10 6 With regard to the University's assertion
that the Guidelines' restrictions on funding of religious activities were
justified due to the state and federal constitutional mandate regarding
neutrality toward religion, the court stated, "it is not the province of this
court to second guess the legal judgments made by the University. So
long as the University's Establishment Clause fears are reasonable, the
Guideline restriction must stand." 10 7 The court, therefore, found that, as
a matter of law, the "Guidelines are reasonable and do not violate any of
the plaintiff's constitutional rights."' 0 8 The court also found that the limitations imposed by the Guidelines did not result in viewpoint
discrimination. 10 9
In response to Rosenberger's claim that the denial of SAF funds to
WAP impermissibly burdened WAP's free exercise of religion, the court
held that the minimal burden placed on WAP must be balanced with the
University's compelling state interest to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. The net result of the balancing was a finding that the
court was unable "to identify any burden of constitutional magnitude that
ha[d] been imposed on the plaintiffs."' 10
The final issue addressed by the court was plaintiffs' contention that
they had been denied equal protection of the laws because other religious
groups had been given SAF monies. 1 1 The court found no evidence of
discriminatory intent with regard to the decision to deny SAF funds to
112
WAP and, therefore, dismissed Rosenberger's equal protection claim.

NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)) (alteration in
original).
105 Id. at 180.
106 Id. at 181.
107 Id.

at 182.
Id. at 181.
110 Id. at 182 ("WAP is unable to point to any facts making their burden unique from
other CIOs which have been denied SAF monies.").
111 Id. at 183.
112 Id. Both disparate effect and discriminatory intent must be shown in order to prevail
on an equal protection claim that challenges a facially neutral statute. Id.
108 Id.
109
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B. FOURTH CIRcurr COURT OF APPEALS
Rosenberger filed appeal with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
contending that "the Guidelines' proscription of SAF funding for 'religious activities' violates the Free Speech and Press Clause of the First
Amendment (1) by depriving them [WAP] of government benefits based
solely on the content and viewpoint of their speech in Wide Awake, and
(2) by excluding them from the 'limited public forum' represented by the
SAF."11 3 A second issue on appeal involved Rosenberger's contention
that the Guidelines' prohibition against subsidizing "religious activities,"
coupled with the University's denial of SAF funds to WAP, violated the
114
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In support of the above contentions, Rosenberger argued "that once
the Rector and Visitors [had] chosen to promulgate guidelines governing
the allocation of funds that support student speech among competing student interests, such guidelines cannot condition funding awards on the
content or viewpoint of a prospective recipient's speech."' 1 5 He maintained that the University's denial of SAF funding based on classification
of WAP as a "religious activity" constituted discrimination in contravention of the First Amendment due to the Guidelines' implicit condemnation of the content and viewpoint of the speech in Wide Awake.' 16 Such
content and viewpoint discrimination Rosenberger characterized as a
7
prior restraint on speech that must be struck down as unconstitutional."
In addressing these contentions, the Fourth Circuit first held that the
publication of religious speech in Wide Awake did fall within the protection of the Free Speech and Press Clause. 1 8 Having deemed Rosenberger's speech in Wide Awake constitutionally protected, the Fourth Circuit
then assessed whether or not the University, through enforcement of its
Guidelines, imposed an unconstitutional condition upon the exercise of
the protected speech.1 19 The court concluded that the University's policy
effectively served as "a prior restraint on University subsidization of all
forms of religious expression in which a CIO might engage." 1 20 As
such, the court held that "when funds are made available to CIOs gener121
ally, they must be distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner."
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the University's refusal to
permit funding of "religious activities" placed a presumptively unconsti113 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 1994).
114 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
115 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 279.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 280.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.

at 280-81.
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tutional condition upon access to government benefits (SAF funding) in
violation of the Free Speech and Press Clause, the Guidelines were nonetheless upheld under a compelling state interest analysis. 122 The University claimed a compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of
church and state as mandated by the Establishment Clause.123 It argued
that funding of "religious activities" would be a direct violation of the
Establishment Clause.1 24 The court agreed that avoidance of an Estab125
lishment Clause violation could be characterized as compelling.
To determine whether offering WAP an equal opportunity to compete for SAF funding would be incompatible with the Establishment
Clause, the court analyzed application of the Guidelines under the
Lemon Test.1 26 First, the court examined the purpose behind the University's adoption of the Guidelines under the first prong of the Lemon
test.127 To do so, the court examined the Guidelines' Student Activity
Statement of Purpose which specified, "[t]he purpose of the student activity fee is to provide financial support for student organizations that are
128
related to the educational purpose of the University of Virginia."
Funds collected via the mandatory student fee were thus to be "administered in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the University as well as with state and federal law." 129 The funding guidelines
further "proscribed funding of 'religious activities' on the ground that
such activities 'do not relate to the educational purpose of the University.' ' 130 The court found the University's purpose in denying SAF
funding to "religious activities" consistent with a facially secular legislative purpose-compliance with the University of Virginia's educational
mission.131 The Guidelines' proscription against funding of "religious
activities" was, thus, deemed permissible under the purpose analysis of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The court's analysis then shifted to examination of the Guidelines in
light of the second prong of the Lemon Test-the effects prong. Under
effects analysis, a court determines whether the primary effect of the policy in question is to inhibit or advance religion. 32 The court rested its
analysis under this prong on three primary factors: (1) the University
had not attempted to ban publication of Wide Awake; rather, the Univerat 287.
123 Id. at 281-82.
124 Id. at 282.
125 Id.
122 Id.

126 Id.
127 Id.

128 Id. at 283.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 284.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 285.
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sity supported its publication through access to University meeting and
printing facilities; 133 (2) the University's refusal to subsidize Wide
Awake directly through payment of its printing costs did not inhibit religion;' 3 4 and (3) awarding SAF monies to Wide Awake would be viewed
135
as state sponsorship and therefore advancement of Christianity.
In light of the above factors, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
"[u]sing public funds to support a publication [Wide Awake] so clearly
engaged in the propagation of particular religious doctrines would constitute a patent Establishment Clause violation."'136 As such, the court held
that the primary effect of SAF funding of Wide Awake publication costs
would be advancement of religion-forbidden by the second prong of
the Lemon Test.137

Analysis of the Guidelines in light of the third prong of the Lemon
Test proved dispositive for the Fourth Circuit's decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the Guidelines in the face of Establishment Clause
challenge. Under the third prong, a court assesses "whether the guidelines' prohibition of funding for 'religious activities' fosters an excessive
government entanglement with religion." 138 The court recognized that
Supreme Court precedent has sanctioned awards of direct nonmonetary
benefits to religious groups when the government body has created an
open fora and when other similarly situated organizations were invited. 139 The court stated, "[d]irect monetary subsidization of religious
organizations and projects, however, is a beast of an entirely different
color."

140

The court further stated, "[a] proper respect for the Establishment
Clause compels the Rector and Visitors to pursue a course of 'neutrality'
toward religion. Yet providing SAF monies to defray the publication
costs of Wide Awake inevitably would advance Wide Awake's Christian
mission." 14 1 Due to Wide Awake's pervasive devotion to the "discussion
and advancement of an avowedly Christian theological and personal phiId
Id.
135 Id.
136 Id ("Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in-the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.") (quoting Justice Powell in Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
133
134

137 Id
138 Id.

139 Id. at 286 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)) (holding that a state university which opens its facilities to registered student groups may not deny equal access to a
registered student group requesting access to those facilities for religious worship or
discussion).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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losophy," the court found that subsidization of the publication would
"send an unmistakably clear signal that the University of Virginia supports Christian values and wishes to promote the wide promulgation of
such values." 142 The court viewed this prospect as impermissible excessive entanglement of the University with religion and thus held that the
University had successfully proven the existence of a compelling state
interest justifying the promulgation of the Guidelines and consequent exclusion of WAP from SAF funding. 143 The court went on to hold that
the Guidelines were narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state
interest. 14 4
With respect to Rosenberger's contention that the Guidelines' prohibition against funding of "religious activities" violated the Equal Protection Clause, the court summarily dismissed the claim due to
Rosenberger's failure to contest the district court's finding that no evidence existed to indicate that the University's denial of funding was the
product of discriminatory intent.' 4 5
III.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BUT IGNORES LEMON
CERTIORARI GRANTED

The Fourth Circuit's decision essentially pitted the strength of the
Free Speech and Press Clause against the strength of the Establishment
Clause and "sanctioned a violation of the Free Speech and Press Clause"
in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. 14 6 Although the
Fourth Circuit justified its decision on the basis of a compelling interest
in avoiding an "establishment of religion" violation, the question remained as to whether a state has a similarly strong compelling interest in
avoiding a free speech violation. 147 Had the Fourth Circuit considered
the compelling interest in avoiding a free speech violation, it would have
148
been caught in a circular analysis of competing compelling interests.
Because the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses were enacted simultaneously as part of the First Amendment, it is difficult to believe that the
142 Id.
143 Id.

144 Id. at 286-87. In order to survive strict scrutiny, the Guidelines had to meet the requirement of narrow tailoring. The court, thus, examined the Guidelines to ensure they were
not broader than necessary to avoid an offense under the Establishment Clause. Id.
145 Id. at 288. The court stated, "[t]o establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff
must show discriminatory intent as well as disparate effect." Rosenberger failed to show discriminatory intent. Id.
146 Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 89, at 512.
147 Charles Roth, Comment, Rosenberger v. Rector: The FirstAmendment Dog Chases
Its Tail, 21 J.C. & U.L. 723, 740 (1995).
148 Id.

19971

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Framers intended for the clauses to be incompatible. As stated in Petitioner's Brief to the United States Supreme Court, "[i]t would be odd,
indeed, if the various clauses of the First Amendment were so inconsistent that enforcement of one required violation of another." 149 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit's holding implicitly acknowledged that the
150
Establishment Clause trumps the Free Speech Clause.
In the wake of the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court, on
October 31, 1994, granted certiorari to decide "[w]hether the Establishment Clause compels a state university to exclude an otherwise eligible
student publication from participation in the student activities fund,
solely on the basis of its religious viewpoint, where such exclusion
would violate the Speech and Press Clauses if the viewpoint of the publication were nonreligious. ' 15 1 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the
52
Supreme Court failed to even mention the Lemon test in its analysis.
Instead, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, focused on the "neutrality"
of the Guidelines in ultimately reversing the Fourth Circuit and holding
that the Establishment Clause would not be offended by funding of WAP
through the Student Activity Funds.153 The Rosenberger decision has
been heralded by some as a "significant step in the Supreme Court's
move away from traditional [separationist] establishment clause jurispru15 4
dence and toward a principle of neutrality."'
B.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS

As a threshold issue, the Court determined that the University,
through application of its Guidelines in denying SAF monies to WAP,
violated WAP's right of free speech as guaranteed by the First Amend149 Brief for Petitioners at 24, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S.
Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329). Petitioners also stated that the Fourth Circuit's decision "puts
the Establishment Clause on a collision course with the rest of the FirstAmendment. It strips
religious speakers of the constitutional protection accorded to secular perspectives and points
of view. It condones discrimination against - not neutrality toward - religion .... This is a
highly implausible reading of the First Amendment." Ma2
150 Roth, supra note 147, at 740.
151 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2521 (1995). This
Note focuses primarily on the Establishment Clause aspects of the Supreme Court's analysis.
Though it will address the holding of the Court with respect to its analysis under the Free
Speech and Press Clause, it will not provide a detailed analysis of the Court's reasoning. For a
more detailed discussion regarding the Free Speech aspects of the case, see id.
at 2516-20.
152 Lemon v. Kurtzman is quoted by Justice Souter, but not in relation to the Lemon test.
Rosenberger, 115 S. CL at 2551 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
153 Id. at 2524. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion of the Court. Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined in the majority opinion. Justices O'Connor
and Thomas each filed concurring opinions. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
154 Kevin Foster O'Shea, Religion in the Schools: A Consensus Emerges, NAT'L L. J.,
Nov. 6, 1996, at A19.
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ment. 155 The Court identified the University's decision to deny funding
to WAP as viewpoint discrimination stating, "[h]aving offered to pay the
third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers who convey their
own messages, the University may not silence the expression of selected
56
viewpoints." 1
The Court heavily relied on the precedential value of Lamb's
Chapel in its finding of viewpoint discrimination. 157 Lamb's Chapel involved a challenge to a school district policy which allowed use of
school facilities after school hours by a wide variety of social, civic, and
recreational groups, but which denied use of the same facilities by groups
for religious purposes. 15 8 Specifically, the school district rejected a request from a group seeking to show a religious-oriented film series on
family values and child-rearing. 159 The Court held that the denial of access to facilities, solely because the film dealt with the subject from a
religious standpoint, violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 160 In so doing, the Court stated, "the First Amendment forbids the
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or
161
ideas at the expense of others."'
The University attempted, unsuccessfully, to distinguish Lamb's
Chapel as an access to facilities case, not a funding of speech case.' 62
They argued that "content-based funding decisions are both inevitable
and lawful,"'163 and that "funding of speech differs from provision of
access to facilities because money is scarce and physical facilities are
not."'164 The Court, finding the University's arguments unavailing,
stated, "[t]he governient cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among
165
private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity."'

Having thus agreed with the Fourth Circuit that WAP' s right of free
speech had been violated, the Court addressed the respective parties'
contentions regarding the question of whether the free speech violation
155
156
157
158

Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520.
Id. at 2517-19.
Id. at 2517-18.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387-390

(1993).
159 Id. at 389.
160 Id. at 394.
161 Id.

162 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1995); Brief
for Respondents at 14, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329) ("Lamb's Chapel involved

access to facilities, not funding of speech. The difference is crucial.").
163 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
164 Id. at 2519.
165 Id. The Court's reasoning hinged on the crucial distinction that when the state is the
speaker, it may make content-based choices regarding funding. However, when the message
being conveyed is that of a private entity (WAP), the state may not discriminate in funding
based on viewpoint. See id. at 2518-19.
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should be excused by the necessity of complying with the Establishment
Clause. 166 Conspicuously absent from the University's brief on the merits, however, was any concerted advocacy regarding the danger of an
Establishment Clause violation if the Fourth Circuit's holding were to be
overturned.1 67 In fact, despite having argued at every stage of litigation,
including its opposition to certiorari, that extending SAF funding to Wide
Awake would violate the Establishment Clause, the University simply
abandoned that argument at the Supreme Court level. 168 Instead, the
University contended that "'[tihe fundamental objection to petitioners'
[Rosenberger's] argument is not that it implicates the Establishment
Clause but that it would defeat the ability of public education at all levels
to control the use of public funds."' 169 The Supreme Court, nonetheless,
addressed the Establishment Clause issue because the Fourth Circuit
rested its judgment on the state's compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation and also because the dissenting members of
170
the Court viewed the issue as determinative.
Rosenberger argued for the Court to adopt an "overarching principal
of neutrality" in its analysis of a potential Establishment Clause violation. 17 1 In arguing for greater clarity in the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, Rosenberger stated, "[t]he time has come for this Court to
make clear: the Establishment Clause does not require, and must not-be
used to justify discrimination against any person or group on the basis of
the religious character of their speech, ideas, or motivation."' 172 In support of this position, Rosenberger cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District which
states, "[t]he Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring
religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion ....

The Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to reli-

1 73
gion, religious ideas, religious people, or religious schools."'
To provide a framework from which to gauge neutrality, Rosenberger offered:
166 Id. at 2520.

167 Id. at 2520-21. See also Brief for Respondents at 27 n.17, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct.
2510 (No. 94-329) ("Respondents do not think it necessary to address the hypothetical question whether the Establishment Clause would permit government aid to religion in this
context.").
168 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520-21; Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Rosenberger, 115
S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329).

169 Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2521 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 29, Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329)).

170 Id. Justice Souter's dissent is unequivocal in its call for affirmance of the Fourth
Circuit's holding. Id. at 2533.
171 Oral Argument of Michael W. McConnell on Behalf of the Petitioners at 11-12, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329).
172 Brief for Petitioners at 31, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329).
173 512 U.S. 687, 717 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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in determining whether distribution of a benefit is 'neutral' toward religion, the court must examine the range
of eligible beneficiaries under the terms of the program.
If the benefit 'is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit
of some legitimate secular end,' then the program is neutral; but if religious organizations are singled out for special benefits, or the eligibility criteria are 'skewed
towards religion' then the program is not neutral. 174
This "test" of neutrality allows for the allocation of an expansive array of
public benefits including the possibility of direct payment to religious
organizations or activities 175-a possibility vehemently contested by the
176
dissenting Supreme Court justices.
Rosenberger's advocacy for adoption of a neutrality principle
largely prevailed. As articulated by the Court, "[a] central lesson of our
decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs
in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion." 177 The Court recognized that the "guarantee of neutrality is
respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria
and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse." 178 Relying on Lamb's Chapel,179 Widmar v. Vincent, 180 and Board of Education of Westside Community Schools (District 66) v. Mergens,1 8' the
174 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329) (quoting Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989); Witters v. Dep't of Soc. Svcs.,
474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)).
175 Id.

In making this determination [neutrality determination], it doesn't matter what the
public benefit in question may be (tax breaks, police and fire service, access to facilities, tuition tax credits, money for vocational education, bus rides, or whatever). All
benefits (even meeting rooms) entail some cost to the taxpayer and confer some
advantage on the user. Nor does it matter how 'religious' the recipient is, so long as
it conforms to the neutral, generally applicable terms of the program.
Id.
176 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against direct monetary aid to religion or religious activities).
177 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
178 Id. See also Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
703 (1994); Witters v. Dep't of Soc. Svcs., 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
179 508 U.S. 384 (1993). For a synopsis of the case and its applicability, see supra notes
158-61 and accompanying text.
180 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a state university may not exclude religious groups
from access to generally available facilities for use by registered student groups on the basis of
the Establishment Clause).
181 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that a public secondary school may not deny a voluntary
student Christian club equal access to school facilities for meetings, and that approval of such
access does not violate the Establishment Clause).
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Court rejected the proposition that the Establishment Clause "even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend free speech rights to religious
speakers who participate in broad-reaching government programs neutral
182
in design."
With "neutrality" as its standard by which to assess an Establishment Clause challenge, and not the Lemon test,183 the Court examined
the guidelines to determine whether or not they would meet the test of
neutrality. Framing its analysis was the Court's contention that assurance against prohibited governmental actions requires inquiry into the
purpose and object of the challenged governmental action, as well as the
practical details of the program's operation.' 8 4 The Court first inquired
into the University's purpose in establishing its Guidelines for distribution of SAF monies and deemed the program neutral toward religion,
finding no reason to believe that the University created the Guidelines to
advance religion. 185 Inquiry into the practical details of the operation of
the Guidelines also confirmed for the Court that the Guidelines, if used
to fund WAP, would still maintain a standard of neutrality. 186 Critical to
this assessment was the characterization of WAP, not as a religious organization, although it was involved in religious activities, but as an organization which met the Guidelines' category for "student news,
information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media
groups." 187 WAP was one of fifteen such groups, all of diverse editorial
viewpoints, eligible for funding in the 1990 school year. 188 Additionally,
the Court noted that WAP did not seek funding due to its Christian editorial viewpoint; rather, it sought funding as a student journal. 189
The Court, further supporting its finding of neutrality of the guidelines, labeled as critical the difference "'between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."' 190 Due to efforts taken by the University to prevent
the views of CIOs from being attributed to the University, the Court
found "no real likelihood" that the religious speech found in Wide Awake
182 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995).
183 Id.at 2521-24. The Court emphasizes the requirement of neutrality of governmental

programs when facing an Establishment Clause challenge; the Lemon test is not even mentioned in the Court's analysis. Id.
184 Id. at 2521.
185 Id. at 2522.
186 Id. at 2522-25.
187 Id. at 2522.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 2522-23 (quoting Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. (Dist. 66) v.

Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
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would be considered either endorsed or coerced by the University. 191
The Court did, however, recognize that "special Establishment Clause
dangers [exist] where the government makes direct money payments to
sectarian institutions. ' 192 In a somewhat superficial manner, the Court
disposed of this concern simply by asserting that "no public funds flow
directly to WAP's coffers." 19 3 That is, payment from the Student Activities Fund was given directly to the CIO's contracted printer, not to the
student organization itself.
The Court's analogy of the funding of third-party contractors for
printing services to funding of school-owned printing facilities for use by
student groups proved more compelling. 194 Under the authority of
Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel,
a public university may maintain its own computer facility and give student groups access to that facility, including the use of the printers, on a religion neutral . ..

basis. If a religious student organization obtained access
on that religion-neutral basis and used a computer to
compose or a printer or copy machine to print speech
with a religious content or viewpoint, the State's action
in providing the group with access would no more violate the Establishment Clause than would giving those
195
groups access to an assembly hall.
As,such, the Court found "no difference in logic or principle, and no
difference of constitutional significance, between a school using its funds
to operate a facility to which students have access, and a school paying a
third-party contractor to operate the facility on its behalf." 19 6 Requiring
a university to forfeit any economies which might be gained by making
use of third-party contractors for printing of student journals and provide
printing services itself in order to avoid an Establishment Clause viola191 Id. at 2523. See also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510
(No. 94-329) ("Under the University's own Guidelines and Contract with CIOs, student groups
receiving SAF funds are not agents or employees of the University, are not part of the curriculum, are not under the control of the University, and thus plainly fall on the 'private' rather
than the 'governmental' side of [the line between government and private speech]."); Brief for
Petitioners at 3, Rosenberger (No. 94-329) (stating that the University's CIO agreement stipulates that benefits provided to student groups by the University "should not be misinterpreted
as meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled by the University, that the University is responsible for the organizations' contracts or other acts or omissions, or that the University approves of the organizations' goals or activities.").
192 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
193 Id.

194 See id. at 2523-24.
195 Id. at 2523.
196 Id. at 2524.
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tion would amount to mere formalism. 197 Ultimately, the Court determined that if the Establishment Clause were read to require the
prohibition of government expenditures whenever those funds "pay for a
service that is, pursuant to a religion-neutral program, used by a group
for sectarian purposes, then Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel
would have to be overruled"-a consequence the majority was unwilling
19 8
to endorse.
To limit the potential breadth of the holding, the Court, in dictum,
specified that "if the State pays a church's bills it is subsidizing it," and
such an abuse must be guarded against. 199 This potential danger was
quickly dismissed with respect to WAP, however, due to WAP's status
as a student journal, not a religious institution or religious
organization. 2°°
The Court concluded its analysis by identifying the potential danger
of censorship of student journals with a religious editorial viewpoint if
the Establishment Clause were read to require a denial of funding in this.
case.20 1 The majority characterized this "specter of governmental censorship" as imperiling the very sources of free speech and expression at
the University. 20 2 As stated by the Court, "[f]or the University, by regulation, to cast'disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital
centers for the nation's intellectual life, its college and university campuses. ' 20 3 Inlanguage reminiscent of analysis under the third prong of
the Lemon test-the excessive entanglement prong-the Court stated,
"official censorship would be far more inconsistent with the Establishment Clause than would governmental provision of secular printing services on a religion-blind basis.... Such inquiries would tend inevitably
to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our
2 04

cases."

The Court's holdings and embracing of the neutrality principle were
summed up as follows:
197
198

Id.
Id. at 2523.

199 Id. at 2524.
200 Id.
201 Id. ("Were the dissent's view [requiring a denial of funding] to become law, it would
require the University, in order to avoid a constitutional violation, to scrutinize the content of
student speech, lest the expression in question-speech otherwise protected by the Constitution-contain too great a religious content.").
202 Id.
203 Id. at 2520. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (characterizing
the public university as "peculiarly 'the market place of ideas"') (quoting Healy v. James, 408

U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
204 Id. at 2524.
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To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary
for the University to deny eligibility to student publications because of their viewpoint. The neutrality commanded of the State by the separate Clauses of the First
Amendment was compromised by the University's
course of action. [Such] viewpoint discrimination
...was a denial of the right of free speech and would
risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion,
which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. There is no Establishment Clause
violation in the University's honoring its duties under
20 5
the Free Speech Clause.
C.

THE EFcrEC

OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRING OPINION

Justice O'Connor, although joining the majority opinion written by
Justice Kennedy, wrote a concurring opinion that, due to the Court's 5-4
split on this case, effectively limits the precedential value of the case by
20 6
narrowing the holding to the specific facts presented by Rosenberger.
She characterized the case as lying "at the intersection of the principle of
government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious
activities. '20 7 In discussing the principle of neutrality, she identified it,
20 8
in both form and effect, as one hallmark of the Establishment Clause.
Competing for recognition with the principle of neutrality, she recognized the axiom that "'[p]ublic funds may not be used to endorse the
religious message.' "209
According to O'Connor, resolution of the conflict of the "two bedrock principles" requires "sifting through the details [of the case] and
determining whether the challenged program offends the Establishment
Clause." 2 10 She continued in reasoning that "[tihe nature of the dispute
does not admit of categorical answers, nor should any be inferred from
the Court's [majority's] decision."121 ' Rather, fine lines must be drawn
based on the specific facts of the case. 2 12 In attempting to draw those
205 Id. 2524-25.
206 Contrast O'Shea, supra note 154 (the "Rosenberger decision means that the First
Amendment's establishment clause no longer rules out the provision of government benefits to
religious groups if the same benefits are provided to secular groups.").

207 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct., 2510, 2525 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
208 Id.

209 Id. (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 642 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 622 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Rosenberger,115 S.
Ct. at 2535-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 2525-26.
211 Id. at 2526.
212 Id.
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lines, Justice O'Connor set forth four conditions specific to the facts of
Rosenberger which she relied on in her decision to join in the majority
opinion. They are as follows: (1) "the student organizations, at the University's insistence, remain strictly independent of the University; '213 (2)
"financial assistance is distributed in a manner that ensures its use only
for permissible purposes ... ensur[ing] that the funds are used only to
further the University's purpose in maintaining a free and robust marketplace of ideas; '2 14 (3) "assistance is provided to the religious publication
in a context that makes improbable any perception of government endorsement of the religious message; '2 15 and (4) the possibility exists that
an objecting student could opt out of the requirement to pay the full stu2 16
dent activity fee.
Justice O'Connor concluded by cautioning that "It]he Court's decision ...

neither trumpets the supremacy of the neutrality principle nor

signals the demise of the funding prohibition in Establishment Clause
'2 17
jurisprudence.
IV.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
AFIER ROSENBERGER

A. CoURT's

ENDORSEMENT OF THE NEUTRALrrY PRINCIPLE

The Rosenbergerdecision makes clear two points: (1) a majority of
the Court supports application of the neutrality principle to Establishment Clause jurisprudence; and (2) the Court, without repudiating the
Lemon test, continues to avoid application of the test to Establishment
Clause challenges.
213 Id. O'Connor highlighted the importance of the agreement between the University and
the CIOs requiring that the student organizations include a disclaimer in all correspondence
and publications that clearly specifies that the student organization is independent of the University and that the University is not responsible for the student organization's contracts, acts
or omissions. Id. at 2527.
214 Id. (citing this as a feature which distinguishes the funding program from a block grant
to a religious organization).
215 Id. (placing reliance on the fact that fifteen other magazines of widely divergent viewpoints are published by student groups (CIOs) at the University).
216 Id. at 2527-28.

[w]hile the Court does not resolve the question here, the existence of such an opt-out
possibility not available to citizens generally, provides a potential basis for distinguishing proceeds of the student fees in this case from proceeds of the general assessments in support of religion that lie at the core of the prohibition against
religious funding.
Id. (citations omitted).
217 Id. at 2528. Justice O'Connor further cautioned that "[e]xperience proves that the
Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single test."
Id. (quoting Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2499
(1994)) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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Unfortunately, while singing the praises of neutrality in the Establishment Clause arena, the Court has failed to enunciate any consistent
test.2 18 Thus, the question arises: What exactly is meant by "neutrality"
and how is it to be applied in the Establishment Clause context? No
uniform answer seems readily apparent, thus, leaving lower courts, legislatures, and public policy officials in the dark once again concerning
their ability to properly evaluate contemplated policies that may infringe
upon the Establishment Clause.
As a threshold matter, debate exists among commentators and members of the Court concerning the concept of neutrality required by the
Establishment Clause.2 19 The two central competing viewpoints are as
follows: (1) the Establishment Clause prohibits "governmental preferences for some religious faith over others"; 220 and (2) the Establishment
Clause prohibits "not only government preferences for some religious
sects over others, but also government preferences for religion over
22
irreligion."
Justice Thomas supports the former view. 222 Chief Justice Rehn-

quist likewise supports the former view as evidenced by his dissent in
Wallace v. Jaffree in which he states:
[t]he Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a 'national' one.
The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others.... States are prohibited
as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however,
nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and
223
irreligion.
Justice Scalia agrees that the Establishment Clause merely prohibits the
endorsement of an official state religion and does not subscribe to the
218 Kagan, supra note 3, at 630. See also McCoy, supra note 19, at 1336 ("Most recently,
the Court has consciously avoided articulating any standard or 'test' in finding that a governmental action violates the Establishment Clause."). See, e.g., Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. 687
(1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992).
219 See Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2529-30 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing disagreement among legal commentators and citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
220 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2529 (Thomas, J., concurring).

221 Id.
222 Id.

223 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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view that it forbids governmental preference of religion over
224
irreligion.
The view prohibiting governmental preference of religion over irre5
ligion, however, is the accepted view of the majority of the Court.2Essentially, "'[c]ivil power must be exercised in a manner neutral to religion,' neither favoring 'one religion to another (n)or religion over irreligion."' 2 26 Civil power may not be used to handicap religion either. 227 As
such, hostility to religion is forbidden.22 8 The concept of "no hostility to
religion" is most clearly exemplified in Establishment Clause challenges
in which religious groups are excluded from government benefits programs that are available to a broad class of participants. 22 9 As stated by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has
never said that 'religious institutions are disabled by the
First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs.' For if the Establishment
Clause did bar religious groups from receiving general
government benefits, then 'a church could not be protected by the police and fire department, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair.' ... [W]e have consistently
held that government programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establish224 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-98
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
225 School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (stating that the Court
has "rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only government preference of one religion over another"). See also Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2537
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating, in reference to Justice Thomas's advocacy for the view that the
Establishment Clause only forbids governmental preference of one religion over religion, "Justice Thomas wishes to wage a battle that was lost long ago, for 'this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference
of one religion over another"') (citing School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
216 (1963)).
226 Kagan, supra note 3, at 621 (quoting Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994)).
227 Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("State power is no more
to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.").
228 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. 687, 717 (1994) ("The Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to religion."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (specifying that the
Constitution forbids hostility toward any religion); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
(1952) ("[W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to
be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of
religious influence.").
229 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Board of Educ. of Westside
Community Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990); Texas Monthly v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Soc. Svcs., 474 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1986); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
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ment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions
230
may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.
Analysis of Rosenberger establishes that it is insufficient to merely
assert that the majority of the Court conclusively adopted a principle of
neutrality in Establishment Clause jurisprudence in which the government program or action in question will be upheld provided it meets the
test of "no governmental preference of one religion over another or preference of religion over irreligion." Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence was necessary to achieve a majority opinion, effectively narrowed
the scope of the holding and the strength of the Court's collective endorsement of neutrality. 23 1 While arguing against fostering a message of
"hostility" toward religion, O'Connor cautioned against the prospect of
sending a message of "endorsement" of religion in its decision. 232 She
also expressed concern regarding the potential violation of the Establishment Clause's prohibition against direct state funding of religious activities. 233 As previously discussed, 234 she distinguished the circumstances
found in Rosenberger from a case involving direct state funding or the
potential for perception of endorsement of religion. 2 35 The tenor of her
concurrence is unmistakable: Neutrality should inform the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence; however, neutrality alone is insufficient to overcome the prohibition against direct funding of religious
activities.
The above caveats to the concept of neutrality, as envisioned by
Justice O'Connor, leave for resolution the question of what test should
lower courts, legislatures, and public policy officials apply to ensure that
their "facially neutral" government program will pass Justice O'Connor's
scrutiny. An assessment of the reasoning applied by Justice Kennedy in
his majority opinion provides instructive guidance. Although Kennedy
avoided even the mention of the Lemon test in his analysis of Rosenberger, his reasoning can nonetheless be viewed as a "de facto" invocation
2 36
of the principles animating the Lemon test.
230 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981)).
231 See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Kagan,
supra note 3, at 632-33 (stating that "the vote upon which the Court's Establishment Clause

majority rests belongs to Justice O'Connor....

[H]ers is the fifth vote needed by Justices

Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas to discard the Lemon test.... However.... Justice

O'Connor has consistently sided with the separationists even as she calls for Lemon's demise.") (footnote omitted).
232 Rosenberger, 115

S.

Ct. at 2525-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

233 Id.

234 See supra text accompanying notes 210-17.
235 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 ("No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the
facts before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.").
236 See infra Part IV.B.
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KENNEDY INVOKES DE FACTO LEMON TEST

In seeking to ensure neutrality toward religion, Justice Kennedy
stated, "we [the Court] must in each case inquire first into the purpose
and object of the governmental action in question and then into the practical details of the program's operation."237 Such an inquiry, although
designed to ensure neutrality of the government program, is strongly
reminiscent of the analysis mandated by the three prongs of the Lemon
test.238 Inquiry into the "purpose and object of the governmental action
in question" is virtually identical to the inquiry conducted under the first
prong of the Lemon test, which, likewise, requires an inquiry into the
purpose of the governmental action.239 Whether the inquiry is performed
under the title of "first prong of Lemon" or under the guise of a neutrality
inquiry, the effect is to ensure that the governmental program was not
established to advance religion. The inquiry must yield a secular purpose
for the program in question. Kennedy found that the purpose and object
of the SAF guidelines passed muster under a neutrality analysis.2 40
Inquiry into the "practical details of the program's operation" invokes both the second prong (the primary effects prong) and the third
prong (the excessive entanglement prong) of Lemon. Under this aspect
of Kennedy's "neutrality" analysis, Kennedy found that the program, due
to its manner of implementation, would neither result in endorsement nor
coercion of religion by the University. 24 ' Had the Court applied the second prong of Lemon, it would have had to determine whether the program would have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting
religion. 24 2 Such an inquiry requires that the state's program neither endorse nor coerce religion, for endorsement or coercion would result in
the impermissible advancement of religion. To rule out such endorsement or coercion, the "practical details of the program" would require
examination-much the same as was required under the neutrality
analysis.
Continuing his analysis of the practical details of the program's operation, Kennedy evaluated the "specter of governmental censorship"
that would arise if the University were allowed to discriminate against
WAP based on the content of Wide Awake. 24 3 Invoking the language of
the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon, Kennedy stated, "official
censorship would be far more inconsistent with the Establishment
237 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521 (emphasis added).
238 See supra Part I (addressing the Lemon test).
239 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
240 Id. at 2522.
241 hd at 2522-23.

242 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
243 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524.
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Clause's dictates than would governmental provision of secular printing
services on a religion-blind basis.... Such inquiries [into the content of
publications] would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in
a manner forbidden by our cases." 24
When viewed in its entirety, Kennedy's majority opinion effectively
incorporates the three prongs of the Lemon test under the rubric of neutrality analysis. Kennedy, like O'Connor, however, appended a caveat to
his trumpeting of the neutrality principle by distinguishing the facts of
Rosenbergerfrom a case involving "direct monetary payment to a sectarian institution." 24 5
The above analysis of both the majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's opinion leads to two questions that will be addressed in turn:
(1) Why, when the Court has seemingly applied a de facto Lemon test
analysis, was the Lemon test so adamantly avoided?; and (2) Can the
Lemon test be salvaged, in such a way as to incorporate the concerns
articulated in the Rosenbergeropinion, to provide greater clarity and predictability to future Establishment Clause jurisprudence?

C.

THE HEART OF THE COURT'S OPPOSITION TO LEMON

Before delving into any specifics concerning how to modify and
salvage the current Lemon test, the underlying premise for the opposition
to the test must be understood. 2 46 Principally, the Lemon test, as currently applied, is seen as hostile to religion 247-directly counter to the
Court's goal of neutrality. "In an effort to avoid entanglement with religion, religious bodies are discriminatorily denied public benefits which
would otherwise be available [were it not for analysis under the Lemon
test]. '' 248 Such hostility is patently manifest in the Court's application of
the current Lemon test in Aguilar v. Felton.249
Aguilar involved an Establishment Clause challenge to New York
City's use of federal funds under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.250 Title I authorized the Secretary of Education
to provide financial assistance to local educational institutions to meet
the needs of educationally deprived children from low-income fami244 Id.

245 See id. at 2523.

246 See supra Part I.B. (providing a critique of the Lemon test).
247 See e.g., CARTER supra note 72, at 111-13; Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717-18 (1994); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421-31 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
248 Kagan, supra note 3, at 643.
249 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
250 Id. at 404. Title I was codified at 20 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994). Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406
n.1.
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lies. 2 5 1

Funding eligibility criteria included (1) the children involved in
the educational program must be educationally deprived; 252 (2) "the children must reside in areas comprising a high concentration of low-income
families"; 25 3 and (3) "the programs must supplement, not supplant, pro'
grams that would exist absent funding under Title I. 254
Funds for instructional services provided under the Title I program
had been used by the City of New York to benefit parochial students on
parochial school premises for nineteen years prior to the Establishment
Clause challenge. 255 In 1981-1982, only 13.2% of the students eligible
to receive funds were enrolled in private schools. 25 6 To benefit these
students, programs were conducted that included remedial reading, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services. 2 57 These programs were conducted by regular employees of public
schools who had volunteered to teach in the parochial schools. 258
In an attempt to avoid Establishment Clause difficulties, the teachers were directed "to avoid involvement with religious activities that are
conducted within the private schools and to bar religious materials in
their classrooms." 25 9 Furthermore, all instructional material and equipment funded under Title I was used only in the Title I programs at the
schools. 260 Interaction between the public school teachers as volunteers
and private school personnel was to be kept to a minimum. 26 1 And, the
parochial school administrators were required to sanitize the classrooms
used by the Title I teachers of any religious symbols. 262 Lastly, unannounced supervisory visits were conducted monthly to ensure compliance with the Title I requirements designed to prevent Establishment
263
Clause violations.
The Court applied the Lemon test to New York City's implementation of the Title I program and struck down the program as unconstitutional. 264 The holding principally rested on the Court's analysis under
the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon. Specifically, the Court
found that "the supervisory system established by the City of New York
251
252
253
254
255
256

Id.
Id. at 405.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 405-06 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 406.
Id.

257 Id.
258

Id.

259 Id. at
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 1l
263 Id.
264 Id.at

407.

410-14.
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inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and state. '265
The Court recognized that separation of church and state does not mandate absence of all contact; however, "the detailed monitoring and close
administrative contact required to maintain New York City's Title I program" were seen as producing "'a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize."'266 Such
contact the Court viewed as "permanent and pervasive state presence" in
267
sectarian schools.
The majority decision in Aguilar was strongly opposed by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. 268 Chief Justice
Burger characterized the tragedy of the Court's decision in stating, "today's decision will deny countless schoolchildren desperately needed remedial teaching services funded under Title 1.''269 He laid the blame for
the result on "the Court's obsession with the criteria identified in Lemon
v. Kurtzman. '270 In addressing the supposed neutrality of the Court's
decision, he stated:
The notion that denying these services to students in religious schools is a neutral act to protect us from an Established Church has no support in logic, experience, or
history. Rather than showing the neutrality the Court
boasts of, it exhibits nothing less than hostility toward
religion and the children who attend church-sponsored
schools.

27 1

Justice Rehnquist noted the Catch-22 paradox that the Court had
created: in order to avoid entanglement, the aid must be supervised;
however, the supervision itself is held to cause entanglement. 272 This
27 3
Catch-22 prevented the City from meeting "an entirely secular need.
Justice O'Connor was equally pointed in her dissent. She first asserted that the Title I legislation as well as New York City's implementation of the funding available under Title I were solely designed to serve a
secular purpose-to provide special educational assistance to disadvantaged children who would not otherwise receive it.274 She also found the
265 Id. at 409.
266 Id. at 414 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
267 Id. at

413.

268 See id. at 419-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.).
269 Id. at 419.
270 Id. (finding that the Court's invocation of the Lemon test "has led to results that are
'contrary to the long-range interests of the country' ") (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985)).
271 Id. at 420.
272 Id. at 420-21.
273 Id. at 421.
274 Id. at 422-23.
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contention that religion would be advanced by the New York City program unsupportable by the facts of the case. 275 Providing a historical
perspective, she stated, "[i]n 19 years there has never been a single incident in which a Title I instructor 'subtly or overtly' attempted to 'indoc276
trinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense."'
She characterized the majority decision as resting on the theory
"that public school teachers who set foot on parochial school premises
are likely to bring religion into their classes, and that the supervision
necessary to prevent religious teaching would unduly entangle church
and state. ' 277 This theory she viewed as an exaggeration of the degree of
supervision necessary to prevent public school teachers from inculcating
religion into their classes. 27 8 'Such a theory, she believed, ignored that
the public teachers are "professional educators who can and do follow
instructions not to inculcate religion in their classes." 279 Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor concluded that "an objective observer of the implementation of the Title I program in New York City would hardly view it
280
as endorsing the tenets of the participating parochial schools."
Reflecting her overall dissatisfaction with the third prong of the
Lemon test, Justice O'Connor specified that "[p]ervasive institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant in deciding the effect
of a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause, but state
efforts to ensure that public resources are used only for nonsectarian ends
should not in themselves serve to invalidate an otherwise valid statute."'28 1 Her criticism echoed that of noted commentator Professor
Choper who attributes the chaos of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
2 82
to the entanglement prong.
V.

PROPOSAL FOR A MODIFIED LEMON TEST

A. PROPOSED TEST
This Note will now address the question previously posed: 283 "Can
the Lemon test be salvaged, in such a way as to incorporate the concerns
articulated in the Rosenbergeropinion, to provide greater clarity and predictability to future Establishment Clause jurisprudence?"
275

Id. at 424.

276

Id.(quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985)).

277 Id. at 421.

278 lId at 425.
279 1&

280 Id.

281 Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
282 Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 681 (1980).
283 See supra Part IV.B.
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The preceding sections regarding the Court's embracing of the neu-

trality principle, the Court's application of the neutrality principle in Rosenberger, and the concerns presented by dissenting Justices in Aguilar
provide a backdrop from which to tailor a modified Lemon test. The
proposed test is designed to accomplish three goals in keeping with what
this Note asserts to be the critical concerns expressed by the majority of
the Court: (1) avoid the lock-step formality of the current Lemon test
that has resulted in decisions characterized as hostile to religion; (2) incorporate the Court's goal of neutrality between religions and between
religion and irreligion; and (3) account for the countervailing consideration of the prohibition of direct funding of religious activities or institutions. To accomplish the above goals, the proposed test recommends a
modification of the second and third prongs of Lemon.
The modified test retains the tripartite structure of the current test.
The first prong in which the governmental action is assessed to ensure
that the program or statute was adopted in light of a secular purpose 2 84 is
not altered in the modified test. The Court has generally defined a nonsecular purpose as one which is designed to either aid or inhibit religion.2 8 5 "[I]t seems clear that, unless a law is proven to be predicated
entirely or almost entirely on nonsecular purposes," the program in question passes constitutional muster under first-prong analysis. 2 86 More
simply, if the legislature or governmental body is motivated in its adoption of the statute or program in question by a desire to provide deliberate aid to religion or to deliberately disadvantage religion, then the
2 87
program is per se unconstitutional.
Upholding the governmental program under first-prong analysis,
although necessary, is not a sufficient condition for safeguarding the program in the wake of an Establishment Clause challenge. Despite adoption of the program for an entirely secular purpose, the program in
question may still fail to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny due to a
violation of either the second or third prong of the Lemon test.
Under the current second prong of Lemon, the primary effect of the
governmental program must neither advance nor inhibit religion.2 88 The
second prong retains vitality within the proposed modified Lemon test;
however, the means to properly apply the secondprong must be specified
284 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., 602, 612 (1971).
285 Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 911 (1987) (citing as examples, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
286 Id. at 909.
287 See McCoy, supra note 19, at 1352 (addressing the unconstitutionality of deliberate
aid to religion).
288 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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to eliminate confusion and to guard against hostility to religion. Fashioning the second prong so as to guard against hostility to religion is crucial
to ensuring a blending of the Lemon test with the principle of neutrality
articulated by the Court in Rosenberger.
As evidenced by the Fourth Circuit's application of the second
prong in Rosenberger,the governmental program will be seen as having
the effect of advancing religion if the effect is analyzed from an "as applied" perspective.2 89 Focusing exclusively "on the religious component
of any activity... inevitably lead[s] to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause." 290 The chief problem associated with an "as applied"
analysis is that any inadvertent aid to or potential advancement of religion can be characterized as governmental endorsement of religion.
Under the current second prong, such endorsement is forbidden as a
2 91
favoring of religion over irreligion.
Under the proposed second prong, the effects of the program in
question should be based on an assessment of the program as a whole,
not from an "as applied" perspective wherein the effects of the challenged program are viewed very narrowly. 292 Thus, a governmental program, adopted for a legitimate secular purpose, that incidentally benefits
religion, should not automatically be struck down for violation of the
second prong of Lemon. Rather, when the program is designed to benefit a broad class of participants, 293 some of which may include religious
289 Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994). The
Fourth Circuit chose to look at the effects of funding of Wide Awake in isolation. Viewed in
isolation, funding of Wide Awake will certainly be seen as an advancement of religion.
Viewed with respect to the wide variety of organizations that receive SAF funding, the decision to fund would be seen as a neutral decision. Id. See also Kagan, supra note 3, at 645
(specifying that an "as applied" analysis under the second prong leads to the unwarranted
conclusion of advancement of religion).
290 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
291 See id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (specifying that to determine whether a statute advances or inhibits religion, the Court must ask whether the action has the effect of
endorsing religion). According to Justice O'Connor, an endorsement of religion sends a
"message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, and favored members of the
political community." Id.
292 See Brief for Petitioners at 42, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115
S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329) ("Rather than examine whether a general program has 'the
practical effect of aiding religion in this particular case,' the court must look to the nature and
consequences of the program viewed as a whole."') (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Soc. Svcs., 474 U.S. 481, 492 (1986)) (Powell, J., concurring).
293 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (requiring
school district to provide an interpreter for a deaf student attending Catholic high school and
stating, "[wihen the government offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian school
as part of a general program that 'is in no way skewed towards religion,' ... that service does
not offend the Establishment Clause") (quoting Witers, 474 U.S. at 488); Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) ("In so far as [a] subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of
nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular
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organizations or activities, the program will be upheld under the modified second prong. Analysis of the program in light of the extent of the
participant class incorporates the Court's articulated desire to ensure neutrality of government programs and avoid hostility to religion. Accordingly, the second prong should read as follows: The primary effect of the
statute or governmental program must neither aid nor inhibit religion.
The effects analysis is to be conducted from the vantage point of the
effects as a whole, not the effects as applied uniquely to a particular
situation. Where the beneficiaries of the program encompass a broad
class of participants,the effects prong will not be violated by unintended
benefit2 94 to a religious organization or activity.
Upholding the principle of neutrality through validation of a program that benefits a broad class of participants alleviates endorsement
concerns; however, it does not necessarily eliminate potential entanglement concerns. Under the third prong of Lemon, excessive entanglement
between religion and government is forbidden. 295 Specifically, a governmental program which requires "continued governmental supervision to
ensure that religion is not advanced . . . constitutes excessive
' '2 96
entanglement.
Entanglement concerns are most acutely present when the government-sponsored aid is in the form of direct monetary aid to sectarian
organizations. Direct funding, by its very nature, is capable of being
channeled to a variety of uses, some of which may impermissibly advance religion and thereby indicate government endorsement of religion.
In such instances, monitoring of the use of the aid is designed to ensure
compliance with the secular purpose of the government program. 2 97 Unfortunately, as discussed by Justice Rehnquist in Aguilar, such monitorend, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the
secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause."). See also Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2532 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The [Establishment] Clause does not
compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits programs that are generally available to a broad class of participants." (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Soc. Svcs., 474 U.S. 481
(1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)); Bila, supra note 5, at 1575 ("A statute that is
generally applicable to a broad class would remain constitutional even if religion also benefits ....
A statute, however, that solely benefits religion would be unconstitutional.").
294 Professor McCoy of Vanderbilt University Law School stated, "[i]n our modem welfare state characterized by government provided health care, education, job training, transportation, and minimum family incomes, inadvertent assistance to religious institutions or
individuals engaged in religiously motivated conduct is inevitable." McCoy, supra note 19, at
1342.
295 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
296 Bila, supra note 5, at 1576.
297 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985).
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ing is itself violative of the excessive entanglement prong, regardless of
the salutary purpose of the governmental program. 298
To avoid this Catch-22 scenario-whereby the governmental program will only survive Establishment Clause scrutiny if use of aid under
the program is monitored for compliance with the intended purpose of
the program, although such monitoring is itself violative of the Establishment Clause-the entanglement prong must be modified. First, the principle of neutrality that has been built into the second prong of the
modified test must be safeguarded. As such, the third prong should only
be invoked when a monitoring requirement exists, and monitoring for
compliance should be limited to situations involving direct monetary aid.
In the absence of direct monetary aid, scrutiny of the governmental
program under the first two prongs of the modified Lemon test is sufficient to ensure that (1) the program was adopted for a secular legislative
purpose, and (2) the program is applied in an effects-neutral mannerneither advancing nor inhibiting religion. The critical inquiry, for assessment of a program that does not involve direct monetary aid to a religious organization, is determination of the class of participants who are
potential recipients of the aid scheme. When a broad class of participants enjoys the benefits of the program in question, the potential for the
governmental program to be seen as an endorsement of one religion over
another or of religion over irreligion is negated. However, in a case involving direct monetary aid, the aid, even if distributed to a broad class
of participants, is subject to potential misuse by the religious participants. 299 Such a misuse of funds could be viewed as endorsement of a
religion and, therefore, requires monitoring of the use of the funds as
well as inquiry to determine whether the monitoring by the government
results in excessive entanglement between government and religion.
To ensure that the Court's concerns regarding such blatant hostility
to religion are accounted for while simultaneously ensuring that the principle of no direct monetary funding of religious institutions is not com298 See id. at 420-21.
299 Justice Thomas argued that the form of aid, direct monetary subsidy or in-kind subsidy, should not affect the assessment of the governmental program subject to Establishment
Clause challenge. He stated, "[t]he constitutional demands of the Establishment Clause may
be judged against either a baseline of 'neutrality' or a baseline of 'no aid to religion,' but the
appropriate baseline surely cannot depend on the fortuitous circumstances surrounding the
form of aid." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (Thomas, J., concurring). As discussed in
Part DI of this Note, however, both the majority and Justice O'Connor were careful to distinguish the Rosenberger facts from a case of direct monetary aid to a religious organization. See
supra Part III. Petitioners in Rosenbergeralso argued in favor of elimination of the entanglement prong in stating, "for agencies of the government to extend benefits neutrally to all,
without regard to religion, eliminates any need for the 'entanglement' that can arise when
government scrutinizes student conduct and attempts to determine which activities are 'reli-

gious."' Brief for Petitioners at 38, Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329). Petitioners'
argument, however, ignored the principle of no direct monetary aid to religious organizations.
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pletely abolished, a balancing test is required within the entanglement
prong.300 Initially, an inquiry should be conducted to determine if an
alternative aid scheme exists that meets the secular purpose of the gov3 0 1 If
ernmental program without requiring monitoring for compliance.
such an alternative exists, then the current program must be struck down
30 2
due to excessive entanglement concerns.
Unfortunately, a viable alternative that satisfies both the secular purpose and the need to avoid excessive entanglement through monitoring
may not be available. In such circumstances, the importance of the secular purpose of the program must be balanced against an evaluation of the
degree of risk 30 3 that, the direct monetary aid poses to impermissibly advancing religion. Such a balancing will require line drawing on a caseby-case basis-a function well suited to the Court. 3°4 This balancing
allows the Court to guard against excessive entanglement while simultaneously guarding against lock-step formalism which results in hostility to
religion. When the secular purpose is deemed to be of sufficient import
to outweigh a slight chance of misuse of aid, the requirement for monitoring can be foregone to enable the principle of neutrality to prevail.
Conversely, when the prospect of misuse of aid is high, the requirement
for monitoring would be deemed sufficiently important to require guarding against the endorsement of religion, thereby, outweighing the secular
purpose.
In summary, the proposed modified Lemon test is as follows:
1. Assess the governmental program in question to ensure that it
was adopted consistent with a secular legislative purpose.
2. Assess the primary effect of the governmental program to ensure
that it neither aids nor inhibits religion. The effects analysis is to be
conducted from the vantage point of the effects as a whole, not the effects as applied uniquely to a particular situation. Where the beneficiaries of the program encompass a broad class of participants, the
300 Professor McCoy proposed a balancing test for use in all Establishment Clause challenges involving unintended aid or apparent endorsement of religion to determine if the unintended effect is too much to be permitted under the Establishment Clause. See McCoy, supra
note 19, at 1374-76. The balancing test this Note proposes is limited to situations involving
monitoring requirements due to direct monetary funding of a religious organization.
301 Id. at 1375.
302 Id. at 1375-76.
303 Walz v. Tax Comm'n., in speaking of the entanglements prong, states, "[t]he test is
inescapably one of degree .... the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and

whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement." 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).

304 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) ("Our jurisprudence in this area is of
necessity one of line drawing."). See also Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925) (Justice
Holmes stated, "[n]either are we troubled by the question where to draw the line. That is the

question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law.").
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effects prong will not be violated by unintended benefit to a religious
organization or activity.
3. Assess the risk of excessive entanglement of government and
religion if, and only if, the governmental program involves direct monetary aid to religious organizations or activities requiring monitoring to
guard against misuse of funds.
a. Determine if an alternative scheme exists that would enable accomplishment of the secular purpose motivating the program while
eliminating the need for monitoring the use of the aid.
b. If no such alternative exists, then balance the importance of the
secular purpose with the degree of risk that direct aid poses to impermissibly advancing religion.
B.

APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED LEMON TEST

To test the efficacy of the proposed Lemon test, this Note will apply
the test to Rosenberger. The modified test will also be applied to Aguilar
because of the criticism this case received due to the Court's use of the
current Lemon test. Lastly, the modified test will be applied to the facts
of Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District due to the Court's complete avoidance of Lemon in deciding that case.
1. Application of Modified Lemon to Rosenberger
In analyzing the University of Virginia's Guidelines regarding SAF
funding of student organizations under the modified Lemon test, the first
step is to determine whether or not the funding guidelines were adopted
consistent with a secular purpose. Both the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court found that the secular purpose requirement was satisfied.30 5 Because the first prong of the modified test is identical to the
current first prong of Lemon, the University Guidelines, likewise, survive modified first-prong analysis.
Under the second .prong of the modified Lemon test, the funding
guidelines must be examined to ensure that their primary effect is to
neither aid nor inhibit religion. The Fourth Circuit, in its analysis, chose
to address the issue from the perspective of: If the funding guidelines
were to allow funding of Wide Awake, would the effect be to aid religion? 30 6 The Fourth Circuit concluded that such funding would be "state
305 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 283-84 (4th Cir.
1994) ("It is clear from the SAF's statement of purpose that the funding guidelines were motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose-the advancement of the University of Virginia's educational mission."); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995) ("There is no suggestion that the University created [the funding
guidelines] to advance religion or adopted some ingenious device with the purpose of aiding a

religious cause.").
306 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 285.
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sponsorship-and therefore advancement-of religious belief. ' 30 7 Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the funding of Wide Awake
in isolation from analysis of the effects of the funding program viewed in
its entirety within the University of Virginia provides a distorted conclusion regarding the effects of the funding. Undoubtedly, aid provided to a
student group that publishes a religiously oriented journal will be perceived as aiding religious belief, if scrutiny of the effects of the funding
is limited to scrutiny of the one publication. However, the modified second prong of Lemon requires that the effects analysis "be conducted
from the vantage point of the effects as a whole, not the effects as applied
uniquely to a particular situation. [And] [w]here the beneficiaries of the
program encompass a broad class of participants, the effects prong will
not be violated by unintended benefit to a religious organization or
'30 8
activity.
The University Guidelines afforded funding to a broad class of participants. 30 9 Such funding of a broad class insulates the governmental
program from objective perceptions of governmental endorsement of
religion. An informed observer who recognized the purpose behind the
adoption of the funding guidelines-to further the educational mission of
the University-and who viewed the diversity of the publications being
supported by SAF funding would be unable to logically conclude that the
University was endorsing a particular religion. 3 10 Thus, funding of Wide
Awake by SAF funds does not violate the modified second prong of
Lemon. Rather, it preserves the principle of neutrality by avoiding a ban
on funding a religious activity that, in the wake of the availability of
funding for anti-religious and secular journals, would send a message of
hostility to religion.
Under the modified third prong of Lemon, the excessive entanglement inquiry need only be pursued if the aid being provided to a religious activity or institution involves direct monetary aid that could be
impermissibly used. Here, the aid is provided directly to a third-party
contractor for printing expenses. This funding scheme effectively pre307

Id.

308 See supra Part V.A.
309 See Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115

S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329) (specifying that 118 student organizations received funding during
the 1990-91 academic year; of these 118 organizations, 15 publications, "representing a wide
range of differing perspectives on issues of concern to the student body, received funding";
further specifying, "[t]he record shows that the University funds student organizations that
express a variety of ideological viewpoints, including but not limited to viewpoints which are
inconsistent with or antagonistic to various religious beliefs.").
310 See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Given this wide
array of non-religious, anti-religious and competing religious viewpoints in the forum supported by the University, any perception that the University endorses one particular viewpoint
would be illogical.").
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vents WAP from using the aid for an impermissible purpose. Thus, the
funding guidelines survive third-prong scrutiny as well. As such, under
the modified Lemon test, funding of WAP through SAF funds would not
violate the Establishment Clause because: (1) the funding guidelines
were adopted consistent with a secular purpose; (2) the primary effect of
the funding, in light of the broad class of participants receiving funding,
neither aids nor inhibits religion; and (3) an excessive entanglement inquiry is unnecessary due to the absence of direct monetary aid to a religious organization or activity.
To further demonstrate the efficacy of the modified Lemon test,
the
facts of Rosenberger will be altered slightly. Specifically, the funding
guidelines, rather than providing direct payment for printing expenses to
the third-party contractor, will be altered so as to provide direct payment
to the student organization for use in covering printing costs. Under this
fact modification, the first-prong and second-prong inquiries remain the
same. However, the third-prong inquiry changes because now there is an
issue of direct monetary aid which must be addressed.
Such direct monetary aid would require University monitoring of
the use of the aid to ensure that the funds provided are used in a manner
consistent with the secular purpose. This very monitoring, however, implicates the problem of excessive entanglement of government and religion. Under the modified third prong of Lemon, the first step requires
that the Court consider whether any alternative schemes exist that would
facilitate accomplishment of the secular purpose and eliminate the monitoring requirement. Obviously such a solution exists-that being the actual procedure of direct payment to the printer as third-party contractor
as opposed to direct payment into the "coffers" of WAP. Thus, the Court
would be required to strike down direct funding of WAP as a violation of
the Establishment Clause under the excessive entanglement prong of
modified Lemon.
2. Application of Modified Lemon to Aguilar
As previously discussed, 31 ' the Court's decision in Aguilar, striking
down New York City's use of federal funds to provide remedial instruction to students of both sectarian and nonsectarian schools, provides an
example of how application of the current Lemon test results in a violation'of the neutrality principle, now embraced by the Court. Analysis of
Aguilarunder the modified Lemon test, however, would result in upholding New York City's use of the Title I funds.
Under the first prong of the modified test, the program being challenged would meet the requirement of having been enacted pursuant to a
311 See supra Part IV.C.
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secular purpose-that purpose being to "distribute financial assistance to
local educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived
children from low-income families. '3 12 Analysis of the program under
the second prong of the modified test, likewise, leads to upholding the
program in the face of Establishment Clause challenge. "Of [the] students eligible to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in private schools. Of that group, 84% were enrolled in schools affiliated with
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Diocese of
Brooklyn and 8% were enrolled in Hebrew day schools. ' 313 Clearly,
with only 13.2% of the eligibility pool for funding consisting of private
schools, there exists a broad class of participants in the Title I program.
As stated in the second prong of the modified test, "[w]here the beneficiaries of the program encompass a broad class of participants, the effects
prong will not be violated by unintended benefit to a religious organization or activity.

'3 14

Because the aid is in the form of direct monetary aid, the excessive
entanglement prong of the modified Lemon test must be considered. The
Court "relie[d] entirely on the [current] entanglement prong of Lemon to
invalidate the New York City Title I program. '3 15 Specifically, the
Court cited the supervisory system, established by the City to guard
against inculcation of religion by the public school teachers in their
3 16
classes, as resulting in the excessive entanglement of church and state.
Under the modified excessive entanglement prong, the first step requires examination of alternate means that would accomplish the secular
purpose-here, providing disadvantaged children remedial instructionwhile simultaneously eliminating the need for State monitoring of the
use of the aid provided. A possible alternate scheme that would not require monitoring to avoid entanglement of church and state due to religious inculcation by the public school teachers in the parochial school
classroom would be to offer the remedial instruction to parochial students, but provide the instruction in public school facilities. Unfortunately, the record in Aguilar
demonstrates that New York City public school teachers
offer Title I classes on the premises of parochial schools
solely because alternative means to reach the disadvantaged parochial school students-such as instruction for
312 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404 (1985). See also id. at 423 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Whether one looks to the face of the statute or to its implementation, the Title I

program is undeniably animated by a legitimate secular purpose.").
313 Id. at 406.
314 See supra Part V.A.
315 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 426 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
316 Id. at

409.
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parochial school students at the nearest public school,
either after or during regular school hours-were
3 17
unsuccessful.
Having no alternative scheme available, the next step within the
modified entanglement prong iniquiry is to "balance the importance of the
secular purpose with the degree of risk that direct aid poses to impermissibly advancing religion. '318 The importance of the secular purpose in
Aguilar is unquestioned. For nineteen years the Title I program helped
impoverished schoolchildren "overcome learning deficits, improv[e]
their test scores, and receiv[e] a significant boost in their struggle to obtain a thorough education and the opportunities that flow from it."' 319 To
be balanced against this benefit to schoolchildren, particularly, and to
society, in general, is the degree of risk posed by allowing public school
teachers to teach secular subjects in parochial school classrooms. Affording great substance to this risk is difficult to justify given the
nineteen year history of the program in which there "ha[d] never been a
single incident in which a Title I instructor 'subtly or overtly' attempted
to 'indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense. '' 320 Thus, the theory that public school teachers, as professionals,
"(most of whom are of different faiths than their students) are likely to
start teaching religion merely because they have walked across the
threshold of a parochial school" is untenable. 32 1 At most, the risk is minimal. Accordingly, the balancing of the importance of the secular purpose against the risk imposed by the program in the absence of
monitoring to guard against excessive entanglement concerns results in
the purpose trumping the risk of the aid being used to impermissibly
advance religion.
Thus, application of the modified test reveals the following: (1) the
Title I program was enacted consistent with a secular purpose; (2) New
York City's plan for the use of the Title I funding makes the funds available to a broad class of participants on a religion neutral basis and, as
such, has neither the primary effect of advancing nor inhibiting religion;
and (3) the importance of the program to enhancing the educational opportunities for disadvantaged children outweighs the potential risk of an
excessive entanglement of church and state resulting from the placement
of public school teachers in parochial classrooms to provide remedial
instruction in secular subjects.
317 Id. at 423 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
318 See supra Part V.A.

319 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 425 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
320 Id. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
321 IdL at 431 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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As such, New York City's use of Title I funds, under a modified
Lemon analysis, would be upheld as constitutional in the face of an Establishment Clause challenge. This result comports with the principle of
neutrality, yet does not ignore the dangers of direct funding of religious
organizations or activities.
3.

Application of Modified Lemon to Zobrest

Subsequent to Aguilar, the Court displayed a greater reluctance to

32 2
invoke the Lemon test in its analysis of Establishment Clause issues.
To further demonstrate the efficacy of the modified Lemon test, the test
will be applied to the facts of Zobrest.
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District involved a suit by a
deaf child and his parents to compel a school district to provide the child
with a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to classes at a Roman
Catholic high school. 32 3 Zobrest claimed that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 324 required the school district to provide
such an interpreter.325 Up to the time of the request for an interpreter to
accompany him to high school, the deaf child had benefitted from the
services of an interpreter in public school. 32 6 Following a decision by
the Arizona Attorney General stating, "providing an interpreter on the
[sectarian] school's premises would violate the United States Constitution," the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district on the ground that "the interpreter would act as a conduit for the
religious inculcation of James [the deaf child]-thereby, promoting
James' religious development at government expense. ' 32 7 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the current Lemon test, affirmed the
district court's decision. 32 8 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit found that the
IDEA has a clear secular purpose: "to assist States and Localities to
provide for the education of all handicapped children. '329 Within its second-prong analysis, however, the Ninth Circuit determined that provision
of an interpreter in a sectarian school, under the authority of the IDEA,
"would have the primary effect of advancing religion and would thus run
afoul of the Establishment Clause. '330 The court was concerned about

322 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995);
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
323 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
324 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994).

325 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
326 Id. The child had attended a school for the deaf from grades one through five and
public school from grades six through eight. Id.
327 Id. at 4-5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
328 Id. at

5.

329 Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)).
330 Id.
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the perception of endorsement or "joint sponsorship" of the sectarian
33
school's activities. '
The Supreme Court, without invoking the Lemon test nor even
mentioning the test, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.332 In its reasoning, the Court stated, "[tihe service at issue... is part of a general
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends. '333 The Court also stressed that the government-paid interpreter
would only be present in a sectarian school due to the private decision of
the child's parents. 334 In continuing with the theme of neutrality as a
guide, the Court stated, "[w]hen the government offers a neutral service
on the premises of a sectarian school as part of a general program that 'is
in no way skewed towards religion,' it follows.., that provision of that
service does not offend the Establishment Clause. '335 Ultimately, the
Court concluded:
The IDEA creates a neutral government program dispensing aid not to schools but to individual handicapped
children. If a handicapped child chooses to enroll in a
sectarian school, we hold that the Establishment Clause
does not prevent the school district from furnishing him
with a sign-language interpreter there in order to facilitate his education. 336
Zobrest provides a case example wherein the Court clearly and purposefully avoided discussion of the Lemon test; however, the case can be
easily decided, consistent with the Court's views on neutrality, through
application of the modified Lemon test. The secular purpose of the
IDEA has already been established. 337 Under modified second-prong
analysis, the provision of a sign-language interpreter would not offend
the Establishment Clause due to the availability of the service to a broad
class of participants. The primary effect of the IDEA, if allowed to provide funding for interpreters to benefit students attending sectarian
school, cannot logically be seen as advancing or promoting religion in
light of the general availability of the benefit to sectarian and nonsectarian recipients, as well as availability to all sects. In denying the services to students attending sectarian schools, however, a message of

334

Il
Id. at 6.
Id. at 10.
Id.

335
336
337

ld. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Soc. Svcs., 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)).
Id. at 13-14.
See supra note 329 and accompanying text.

331

332
333
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hostility, rather than neutrality, is sent regarding religion. Accordingly,
the program at issue would pass muster under the modified secondprong.
Turning to the third prong, the inquiry is not required because direct
monetary aid is not being provided to the sectarian institution. Rather,
aid is being provided to the parents of the deaf student. "[U]nder the
IDEA, no funds traceable to the government ever find their way into
sectarian schools' coffers. 33 8
C.

EFFICACY OF THE MODIFIED LEMON TEST

Application of the proposed modified Lemon test to not only Rosenberger and a factually modified Rosenberger hypothetical, but also to
Aguilar and Zobrest evidences the efficacy of the test for future Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The modified test effectively incorporates the Supreme Court's goal of neutrality between religions and
between religion and irreligion. It simultaneously provides a principled
methodology for considering the potential endorsement and entanglement concerns inherent in governmental schemes that result in direct
monetary aid to religious organizations or activities. The balancing of
interests that must be conducted under the third prong of the modified
test if an alternative aid scheme is unavailable will enable the courts to
properly safeguard the principle of neutrality and avoid the lock-step formalism that can result in hostility to religion. In so doing, however, the
courts retain the discretion to strike down direct monetary aid schemes
that result in excessive governmental entanglement that is not outweighed by the secular purpose of the governmental program at issue.
The greatest benefit that adoption of the proposed test would provide,
however, is provision of a methodology of analysis in Establishment
Clause cases that can not only be applied by courts, but also by legislatures and public policy officials contemplating promulgation of a policy
that may be subject to Establishment Clause challenge.
CONCLUSION
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence through a refinement of the Lemon test. The Court
chose to ignore Lemon in its decision and thus lost a valuable opportunity. As a result, lower courts, legislatures, and public policy officials
continue to be left with inadequate guidance regarding Establishment
Clause issues.
338

Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
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Analysis of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, coupled with the
effect of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, however, enables development of a modified Lemon test that not only embraces the Court's
articulated desire to ensure neutrality between religions and between religion and irreligion, but also addresses the Court's concerns regarding
direct funding of religious activities and organizations. This Note
presents such a modified test. Adoption of the proposed test will benefit lower courts that continue to struggle with application of the current
Lemon test and the lack of clear direction provided by the Supreme
Court in the Establishment Clause arena. The modified test will prove
equally instrumental in enabling legislatures and public policy officials to
properly craft governmental programs and aid schemes that will survive
Establishment Clause challenge.
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